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Abstract:
Self-targeting  (ST)  is  a  method used to  allocate  social  transfers  toward  specific  households.  This
method  is  an  alternative  to  classical  targeting  (T)  based  on  selecting  specific  areas  or  villages,
selecting specific categories of households, or relying on the persons in charge of local communities.
The principle of ST is very simple: the transfers are proposed to all households in the community but
conditions are created to discourage households that are not in need to ask for them. Three basic
methods are used: low quality food is distributed; queues are created intentionally when distributing
the  food  or  the  cash;  a  matching  contribution in  the  form of  work  is  asked.  Many  experts  are
enthusiastic with ST because it proves to be much more effective than T. However, others persons are
horrified by ST. The paper addresses three puzzles: identify what drives the feeling (felt  by many
people) that there is something wrong with self-targeting; explain why some people are horrified by
self-targeting while others do not see any problem with it ; specify who is wrong and who is right, i.e.
clarify if there is really something wrong with self-targeting. To solve the first puzzle, we compare ST
with  T  by  using  different  criteria  proposed  by  ethics  and  related  to  endowments,  welfare  and
freedoms. We also mobilized empirical results produced by anthropologists of development showing
the numerous unintended effects of targeted cash transfers implemented in Niger in 2005. This led us
to propose a hypothesis that explains not only the first puzzle but also the two others.
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The first time I heard about self-targeting (the topic was the self-targeting of food aid), I was horrified.
Since then, I asked many people what they feel about it. And you know what? It seems humanity can
be divided into two parts: those who are horrified and those who “don’t see where the problem is”.
But I should first explain what is self-targeting.  
1. SELF-TARGETING
Self-targeting is a method used to allocate social transfers toward specific households. Social transfers
can be made of cash, food, voucher or other goods (for instance agricultural inputs). They can be
implemented on a permanent basis (with the aim to reduce poverty or chronic malnutrition) or only
when a crisis occur. In both cases, the challenge is to channel the transfers toward households who
need them. And only toward these households: because, otherwise, the cost of the transfer program
would be huge.  And also because transfers  may generate  market  distortions:  cash transfers  may
distort  the  labor  market,  food  transfers  the  food  markets  and  fertilizer  transfers  the  market  for
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fertilizers. This is the reason why it is usually considered necessary to restrict the group of recipients
to household in needs. 
The problem is that targeting households in needs is highly complicated. Several methods exist such
as geographical targeting (based on identifying affected areas), administrative targeting (based on
specific household-related criteria) or community–based targeting (based on relying on the persons
in charge of local communities). All these methods are costly and, even when combined, they are also
imperfect: part of households in needs are not covered (exclusion error) whereas part of households
who don’t need the aid receive it (inclusion error), see matrix 1.
Households in needs?
Yes No
Recipients? Yes A: rightly included households B:  wrongly  included  households
(inclusion error)
No C:  B:  wrongly  excluded  households
(exclusion error)
D: rightly excluded households
MATRIX 1
Empirical studies show that, for many transfer programs, the inclusion and exclusion rates are high,
meaning not only that there are significant “leakages” (high percentage of non-poor or non-food
insecure households included) but also (and this is much more problematic) that a high percentage of
poor or food insecure households are not covered (Banerjee, 2016 ; Brown et al., 2016). Moreover,
almost all empirical studies deal with permanent transfers, which are the type of transfers for which
the targeting is less difficult because the persons in charge of designing the transfer program can
implement large household surveys and build a database of households with detailed information on
their needs and incomes. The case of emergency transfers is more complicated. When a food crisis or
a famine occurs, you have very little time to implement the distributions and your means (including
logistical means) are often limited. Although we have very few data for emergency transfers, it seems
reasonable to assume that the targeting effectiveness is even (much) lower for them. With dramatic
consequences, as targeting errors may result in strong deficiencies in calories or nutrients that may
entail –directly or indirectly- the death and endanger the development of young children’s brain. 
The practical  issue is reducing the inclusion error and exclusion error rates. A way to proceed is
applying less restrictive criteria to select the recipients. By so doing, you will reduce the exclusion
error rate but increase the inclusion error rate. An alternative is to apply more sophisticated targeting
methods (based, for instance, on detailed household surveys). Then, you may be able to reduce both
types of errors. But the cost of the targeting will increase. If your budget is limited, this means that
you will have to reduce accordingly the amount transferred (the number of recipients and/or the
amount  per  transfer).  There  is  in  fact  a  kind  of  trade-off  between the  inclusion  error  rate,  the
exclusion error rate and the cost: reducing one of them often implies increasing at least one of the
two others. A complicated puzzle. Even more complicated by the fact that the difficulties of targeting
are not only (sometimes not mainly) technical: targeting is also likely to generate political economy
issues, as decision-makers are likely to receive pressures to provide transfers to specific social groups.
Here comes self-targeting (ST). ST has been proposed has a solution to overcome the poor efficiency
of  classical  targeting  methods  (T).  The  principle  is  very  simple:  the  food  aid  is  proposed  to  all
households in the community but conditions are created to discourage households that are not in
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need to ask for it. Three basic methods are used: low quality food is distributed; queues are created
intentionally when distributing the food or the cash; a matching contribution in the form of work is
asked. Of course, the “low quality food” distributed is always safe and nutritive: it is just that it does
not fit with local habits and preferences. When a participation to public works is asked as a matching
contribution (like in the “food for work” and “cash for work” programs), the wage should be low
enough to discourage non-food insecure households from participating.  But, of course, households
who are not able to provide the work (because they are old, seek or with deficiencies) are exempted
from this requirement. 
The  rationale  of  ST  can  be  represented  as  follows.  To  get  the  transfer,  you  should  accept  an
“inconvenience”: the matching contribution in work, the time spent in the queue or the reluctance of
having to eat a food you do not like (depending on the modality of ST used). The utility generated by
receiving a transfer can expressed by U = U(A) – C(I), U(A) being the utility related to the amount A
received  and C(I)  being  the cost  of  the inconvenience  intentionally  introduced through the self-
targeting method used. Why should this cost result in households self-selecting themselves in an
effective way? Let us consider two households: a household i that needs food aid and a household j
that does not need it. Their utility when receiving the transfer is given by: U i = Ui(A) – Ci(I) and Uj =
Uj(A)  –  Cj(I).  We  may  reasonably  expect  Ui(A)  >  Uj(A):  the  same amount  of  money  or  food  will
generate more utility when transferred to a poor or food insecure household than when transferred
to an household from, let us say, the middle class. We may also reasonably expect C j(I) > Ci(I) the
(opportunity) cost of the time spent queuing or working for the transfer program is likely to be higher
for the less poor households because they usually have more economic opportunities. This means
that we may reasonably expect Ui > Uj. If I is correctly fine-tuned (the length of the queue, the level of
quality of the distributed food, the wage paid for recipients’ work), we may expect that for (almost)
all  households  in  need,  the utility  of  receiving the transfer  will  be  positive (they will  accept  the
transfer), whereas for (almost) all households not in need, this utility will be negative (they will not
ask for the transfer). What ST is offering us is the promise of an effective targeting. We may even say
the promise of an efficient targeting, as the cost of ST seems to be quite low, compared to classical
targeting methods.   
Now you know what self-targeting is. Are you shocked? Enthusiastic? 
2. IS THERE SOMETHING WRONG WITH SELF-TARGETING?
Economists are usually enthusiastic. They like cost-effective tools and self-targeting is a very low cost
method that proved to be effective in selecting only households in needs (see for instance Alatas et
al., 2016). Some year ago, I had the opportunity to question two of the main international experts of
food security and food aid. They said they do not see where the problem is. The first one gave me the
example of Ethiopia where cash for work programs were implemented with the result of improving
food security both in the short term -thanks to the cash transferred to food insecure households- and
in  the  long  term,  because  recipients’  work  contributed  to  improve  the  roads  and  thereby  the
connection between surplus areas and deficit  areas.  The second expert  gave me the example of
Mozambique where imported yellow maize (considered as a low quality compared with the local
white maize) succeeded in self-targeting food insecure households, while having no depressing effect
on white maize price and production. Both of them said that, compared with the consequences of
malnutrition,  having  to  consume low quality  food is  not  really  a  problem. And they are  right  of
course, from some point of view. 
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One months later, I had the opportunity to discuss the same question with recipients of food aid, in
France. They were complaining about the low quality of the distributed food and about the long
queues  to  get  their  “basket”.  I  told  them  that,  in  developing  countries,  the  low  quality  of  the
distributed food and the long queues are not only related to cost and logistical issues (as is the case in
France), but were purposely created to generate self-targeting. You know what? They were horrified.
I  replicated  the “experiment”  with  many people.  Some of  them were experts  on food aid,  food
security, poverty or social transfer programs. Others were not aware of these topics and I had to
explain them what was social transfers, targeting methods and self-targeting. In both groups, some
people were horrified while others do not see any problem with self-targeting methods. 
The coexistence of these two (so contrasted) reactions raises several puzzling questions. First, what
explains  the  feeling  that  “there  is  something  wrong  with  self-targeting”?  Second,  why  do  some
people only share this feeling whereas other do not see any problem with ST? Third, who is right and
who is wrong? The general answer to the second question is obvious: people from the two groups
apply different criteria. Answering the third question would therefore require using a kind of meta-
criterion to assess the criteria used by both groups. But maybe the most puzzling question is the first
one, a question that can be expressed like this: “What are the criteria used by people who feel that
there is something wrong with self-targeting?”.  For people of the other group (those who “do not see
where the problem is”), it is quite easy. They are pragmatist people: they are in favor of what works
and self-targeting works well  (it  targets effectively households in needs, at a low cost). Therefore
applying  self-targeting  allows  maximizing  the  impact  of  transfer  programs  on  poverty  or  food
insecurity. But, for the first group, it is more complicated. Although I am part of this group (I feel that
“there  is  something  wrong  with  ST”),  I  face  difficulties  to  explain  what  is  wrong.  The  analysis
developed in this article is an attempt to answer this question. 
3. WHAT IS WRONG WITH SELF-TARGETING?
Let  us  first  clarify  that  I  did  not  question  the  cost-effectiveness  of  self-targeting.  The  empirical
literature converge toward the idea that self-targeting is very cost-effective, not perfect but much
better than classical targeting. Although some divergent works emphasize the limits of ST (see for
instance Alderman and Lidert, 1998), I will not enter into this debate. Even assuming that ST is very
cost-effective, my feeling is that there is still a problem with it. In this article, to be extremely clear
and simple, I will even assume that ST leads to perfect targeting (no inclusion or exclusion errors).
And I will try to investigate what is wrong, in spite of this assumed perfectness. 
How  to  go  beyond  cost-effectiveness?  The  point  of  departure  is  the  observation  that  the  cost-
effectiveness of ST only refers to the point of view of the transfer program, with its objective (reduce
poverty,  improve food security)  and its  limited means.  To go beyond cost-effectiveness,  we have
therefore to go beyond the point of view of the social transfers program. And consider the point of
view of the households that are the potential recipients of the transfers. Then, the question we have
to  consider  is  the  following:  can  their  life  be  worsened because  of  the  implementation of  self-
targeted transfers? 
Answering this question requires criteria to compare the situation of the considered population with
transfers targeted through classical methods (T) versus with self-targeted transfers (ST). Many criteria
have been proposed by  the numerous theories  of  justice.  The authors  of  these theories  usually
consider that the criteria  they propose should not be applied to a specific institution but to the
complete set of institutions of a given society.  Anyway, as we can consider social transfers as an
optional institution (it  can exist  or not),  it  seems that we can use the clause  ceteris  paribus and
discuss whether households’ situation with the transfers is better or worse than the situation without
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the transfers and, similarly to compare the situations resulting from transfers with T  versus ST. In
other words, we can try to assess the contribution of transfers to the satisfaction of criteria of justice
in the considered population, depending on whether they are targeted through T or  ST.  We will
consider successively criteria based on endowments, welfare and freedoms, before considering the
effect of transfers on social relations. 
Endowments
The simplest and most intuitive way to analyze whether ST is better or worse than T is to considerer
their impact on households’ endowments. To do this, we need a criterion allowing us to rank different
set of endowments from the better to the worse. An intuitive criterion is based on equality. Under
this criterion, ST can be considered as better than T if it contributes to reduce more the inequalities
within the considered population. We will consider this criterion in a second step, but we have first to
consider criteria more in line with the objectives of transfers. Indeed, transfers explicit objectives are
not related to reducing inequalities but to reducing poverty or food insecurity. They are more related
to a rationale of maximin (improve as much as possible the situation of the less favored persons).
Therefore,  they are closer to the “difference principle”  proposed by John Rawls in his  Theory of
Justice (Rawls, 1997). However, for Rawls, the difference principle cannot be considered separately
from  another  principle:  the  “fair  equality  of  opportunity  principle”.  Let  us  consider  these  two
principles.
Rawls’ “fair equality of opportunity principle” means that persons in a similar situation (e.g. the same
skills) should have the same opportunities (e.g. job opportunities). Social transfers targeted through
classical methods (T) are supposed to meet this criterion: all poor or food-insecure households are
supposed to have access to the transfers, contrary to non-poor and non-food insecure households.
However  as,  in  practice,  the  targeting  through  classical  methods  (T)  is  always  imperfect,  some
households in needs do not have access to the transfers (although they are in a quite similar situation
as other households in needs who have access to the transfer) and symmetrically part of households
who are not in needs have access to the transfers. Under this principle, ST is clearly better: as it offers
the same opportunity to all households, a fortiori all households in a similar situation have the same
opportunity to access the transfers. Quite the same conclusion can be drawn for Rawls’ “difference
principle”.  The  targeting  through  classical  methods  (T)  theoretically  meets  this  principle:  the
difference made between households who do not have access and households who have access
clearly advantages the less favored people because those who have access are poor or food insecure
households.  However,  in  practice,  because of  the targeting imperfectness,  part  of  households  in
needs do not  receive the transfers,  whereas  part  of  households  not  in  needs receive  them: the
maximin rationale of the principle of difference (improving as much as possible the endowments of
the less favored) is clearly not met. The situation is better with ST as the rate of targeting errors is
lower with ST than with T. With the (unrealistic) assumption made in this article that ST leads to a
perfect targeting, we can even say that ST fully meets the difference principle (the difference made
between recipients and non-recipients clearly advantages the less favored people). 
Although  equality  is  not  part  of  the  explicit  objectives  of  social  transfers,  we  can  consider  the
potential contribution of transfers to reducing inequalities. By increasing the endowments of poor
households and only poor households, social transfers are supposed to reduce the gap between poor
and non-poor households and, by this way, to contribute to reduce inequalities (although they do not
affect  inequalities  within  the  group  of  poor  households  and  within  the  group  of  non-poor
households). Theoretically, this result holds whatever the targeting method used (T or ST). But, again,
the imperfectness of targeting changes the picture. As ST is assumed to generate a better targeting
than T, it is likely to contribute more to reducing inequalities. In brief, whatever the criteria used to
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compare households endowments, ST seems to be better than T. If we want to understand what is
wrong with ST, we have to move to other sets of criteria. Let us try criteria based on welfare.  
Welfare
Criteria based on welfare take into account more information than criteria based on endowments.
What matters is not only the objective consequences of the transfers (the food or cash received) but
the way they affect the welfare of the recipients and potentially of the non-recipients.
The first  step  is  clarifying  the  counterfactual:  the reference situation can  be  no  transfers  (ST  vs
nothing) or transfers targeted by classical targeting methods (ST vs T). Let us consider first the case
‘ST vs nothing’. It seems that offering self-targeted transfers i) does not change the situation of the
households who reject the transfer and ii) can only improve the situation of the households accept it.
As self-targeting allows households to choose whether they want to be recipient or not, it allows
them to put in balance all these costs and benefits: if properly informed, they will accept to receive
the transfers only if for them the benefits are higher than the costs. Therefore, it seems that, when
self-targeted, transfers are always beneficial for the recipients (and neutral for the other households).
Therefore it seems that the situation with ST is always better than the situation without transfers (ST
> nothing).  In other words, implementing ST transfers always generate a better situation than no
transfers, according to the Pareto criterion: it improves the situation of at least one person without
deterring the situation of even a single person1.   
The second comparison (ST vs T) is more complex: shifting from T to ST generates both winners and
losers. This can be easily understood by referring to the four categories of households described in
matrix 1 and assuming that ST generate a perfect targeting. In a first step, we will also assume that
the total amount transferred remained unchanged. With these assumptions, the winners and losers
are as follows:
 Households from category A were already receiving the transfers with T and are still receiving
it with ST. However, with ST they have to incur the cost of the inconvenience intentionally
introduced (providing a matching contribution in work, queuing, or eating food products they
dislike). Therefore, they are losing when the targeting method shifts from T to ST. 
 Households from category B are clearly losing: they were receiving a transfer with T and they
do not receive it anymore with ST
 Households  from  category  C  are  in  the  opposite  situation:  they  were  not  receiving  the
transfers with T and they receive it with ST. As they choose to take the transfers whereas they
were free to leave them, we know that the transfer is welfare-improving for them.
 Households from category D do not receive the transfers (neither with T nor with ST). For
them, there is no difference between T and ST. 
What can be said about the aggregated effect of shifting from T to ST? As there are winners and
losers, we cannot apply the Pareto criterion (as we did for the comparison ‘ST vs nothing’). Anyway,
assuming  that  individual  utilities  can  be  compared  and  aggregated,  we  can  identify  two  factors
playing  in  opposite  direction.  First,  the  total  amount  transferred  (assumed  to  be  unchanged)  is
allocated differently: the transfers toward households of category B are diverted toward households
of category C. For the reasons explained in section 1, we can reasonably assumed that the utility
generated by the same amount received is higher when the recipients are households in needs than
1 Setting aside the question of the financing of the transfer program (assuming that it is financed from outside,
not by taxes paid by members of the considered population). Note also the way the transfer are funded is not
affected by the way the targeting is done (T or ST): there is therefore no reason to think that the funding of the
transfers can affect the compared performance of T and NT.  
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when  they  are  not.  This  factor  therefore  plays  in  favor  of  ST  being  superior  to  T  (in  terms  of
aggregated welfare generated). The second factor is related to the cost C, purposely introduced in ST
to  incentivize  the  households  to  self-select  themselves.  It  reduces  the  utility  of  all  recipients
(households of category A and C). Therefore, strictly speaking, the effect on aggregated welfare of
shifting from T to ST is undetermined. Although the supporter of ST will argue that the gain in utility
induced by better targeting poor or food insecure households is much higher than the cost of the
inconvenience purposely introduced by self-targeting methods.   
Two other  factors  support  the idea that  ST  is  likely  to  be better.  The first  one is  related to  the
compared cost of T and ST. Until now, we assumed that the total amount transferred is the same with
T and ST but, as ST is usually less costly, it seems more reasonable to assume that the money saved
on the cost of targeting is used by the social transfer program to increase the amount transferred (the
amount  per transfer,  the frequency of  the transfers and/or the number of  recipients).  This  is  an
additional reason for thinking that ST is likely to be better than T. The second factor is more subtle. It
is  related to psychological  costs  generated by  T  and (supposedly)  removed by  ST.  The utilitarian
framework  is  usually  linked  with  a  selfishness  assumption:  agents’  utility  is  assumed  to  be
independent from the situation of other agents. Anyway, sociologists and psychologists showed that
this  is  often not  the  case:  for  instance,  people  can  be  jealous  or,  on  the  contrary,  altruist.  The
utilitarian framework can take into account this phenomenon: the only thing to do is to assume that
the  utility  function of  agent  i  depends on  j’s  income or  utility.  In  the case  of  classical  targeting
methods (T), two effects have to be considered: recipients may feel stigmatized and non-recipients
may feel excluded. An interesting consequence is that non-recipients may be negatively affected by a
transfer program (their utility decreases if they feel excluded) but, more surprisingly, this can also be
the case for recipients (if the disutility generated by stigmatization is higher than the utility generated
by the amount received). With the final consequence that a transfer program implemented through T
is not necessarily better than no transfers at all.  As, with ST, households themselves choose to be
recipient  or  not,  it  seems  that  the  psychological  costs  related  to  the  feelings  of  exclusion  or
stigmatization disappear or, at least, are strongly reduced. And this is the reason why, as we saw at
the  beginning  of  this  section,  ST  can  be  considered  as  being  Pareto-superior  compared  to  the
situation without transfers.
The situation can therefore be summarized as follows:
(1) Utility with T (2) Utility with ST ∆ Utility : (2) – (1)
Recipients U (A) – U(S) U*(A*) – C(I) U*(A*) – U (A) + U(S) – C(I) 
Non recipients -U(E) U(E)
Total U (A) – U(S) -U(E) U*(A*) – C(I) U*(A*) – U (A) + U(S) + U(E) – C(I)
MATRIX 2
The welfare gains generated by shifting from T to ST are therefore the following:
 U*(A*) – U (A) > 0 because i) A* > A : the money saved thanks to ST’s lower cost is used to
increase the amount transferred and ii) U*(X) > U (X): the same amount transferred to an
household in need generate more utility (and with ST –contrary to T- all recipient households
are assumed to be households in needs).
 U(S) : the stigmatization cost is supposed to be nil (or at least lower) when the household
itself chose to accept the transfer.
 U(E): the exclusion cost is nil when the household itself chose to reject the transfer.
The only element that plays against ST is the cost C(I) of the inconvenience purposely introduced to
incentivize the households to self-select themselves. It is enough to say that the effect on aggregated
welfare is theoretically undetermined. But at the same time, it is seems reasonable to assume that
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most of the time C(I) is inferior to the three elements listed above (and therefore that ST is usually
better than T).
 
To sum up, although there is no certainty that ST is better than T from the point of view of aggregated
welfare,  many elements suggest  that  it  is  the case, most of  the time. In addition,  the utilitarian
approach did not give us good reasons to be horrified by ST, as it seems that ST does not generate
dramatic consequences for households’ welfare. Therefore, the two approaches we explored do not
help  us  to  identify  what  is  wrong  with  self-targeting:  neither  the  consequences  on  households
endowments  nor  the  consequences  on  households  welfare  seem  to  be  horrific.  These  two
approaches have in common to be purely consequentialist: they are only based on the objective
(endowments) or subjective (welfare) consequences of T and ST. To go further, maybe it is worth
exploring approaches that are not purely consequentialist: approaches based on freedoms. 
Freedoms
Different  philosophical  streams emphasized the importance of  freedom to choose.  No (as in the
utilitarian approach) because more freedom to choose often results in better decisions (following the
classical argument that individuals usually know better than anyone else what is good or convenient
for them). But because they assume that freedom to choose has a value in itself, independently from
its consequences on individuals or groups. This non-consequentialist approach based on freedom has
deep roots in the history of thought. For instance, during the 18 th century, the debate on slavery
developed within two different frameworks:  the utilitarian framework and a non-consequentialist
framework  based  on  human  rights  (within  both  frameworks,  there  was  both  supporters  and
opponents to the abolition of slavery). 
During  the  20th century,  the  non-consequentialist  approach  based  on  freedom  has  been  mainly
developed by the libertarian thought. People like Robert Nozick emphasized the role of the law and
prohibitions in reducing individual freedoms (Nozick, 1988). They recommended minimizing as much
as possible the scope of prohibited behaviors, putting a strong emphasis on the absolute respect of
property rights. For instance, the property right one has on his own body should not be constrained
by a law prohibited the sale of organs). The main argument of libertarians against social transfers is
related to the way they are financed: if  they are funded by taxes, these taxes may be viewed as
unjustified constraints  restricting  individual  property  rights  and  freedom.  I  will  not  consider  this
argument here as I assume that the financing is external to the considered population (see footnote
1). However, the issue I have to deal with is the mirror image of taxes. Should we consider than
receiving  a  transfer  without  having  applied  for  it  and  without  being  willing  to  receive  it,  is  an
unjustified restriction of individual freedom? I am not referring here to unpleasant feelings associated
with receiving an unwilling  transfer  (such as the feeling  of  being  stigmatized):  these feelings are
related to welfare (see previous section), not to freedom. I am referring to the following question:
“Can receiving an undesired transfer be considered as a restriction of freedom exactly in the same
way as an unwilling tax can be considered as a restriction of freedom?”.  To my best  knowledge,
Libertarian never studied this kind of question and I do not know if for them the answer can be “yes”.
But for my purpose, it does not matter: either receiving an undesired transfer is not a problem and, in
this  case,  ST  is  equivalent  to  T  (they  do  not  generate  any  problem  for  individual  freedom);  or
receiving  an undesired transfer  is a  problem and,  in  this  case,  ST  is  better than T  (ST  does not
generate  any problem for  individual  freedom,  but  T  does).  Note that,  in  this  case,  it  is  not  the
compared effectiveness of T ans ST that matters (as was the case with criteria based on endowments
or welfare) but the fact that, with ST, receiving a transfer is the result of a choice whereas with T, it is
the result of someone else’s decision. In all cases, ST is at least as good as T: the libertarian approach
is not very helpful to understand what is wrong with ST.   
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Other theories propose lists of freedoms that should be guaranteed. Rawls for instance proposed a
list of “basic liberties” such as political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office), freedom of speech and
assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of property; and freedom from
arbitrary  arrest  (Rawls,  1997).  It  seems  that  none  of  them  can  be  affected  by  social  transfers
(whatever the method used for targeting). 
Maybe the problem with these theories is that they are only concerned with formal liberties. The
approach on capabilities developed by Amartya Sen implies much more than the libertarian view:
beyond formal liberties, it stresses the importance to allow people to  really have the choice (Sen
1985). What may require specific interventions to increase the capabilities of persons in difficulty. For
instance, to be free to choose, some people will  need more endowments (case of poor people),
others will need more infrastructures (case of people living in a remote area far from a hospital) and
others more education. The point is that in Sen’s view what matters is not only the fact that people
with more capabilities are likely to have different “functionings” (“beings and doings”) and finally a
better life (according to their own criteria of what is a good life). The freedom to choose also matters
per  se  :  it  has  a  value in  itself,  independently  of  its  consequences.  That  is  the reason why his
approach (called “broad consequentialism”) is a mixed approach of freedom: like the libertarians, he
gives an intrinsic value to freedom; like purely consequentialist approaches (based on endowments or
welfare), he takes into account the consequences of freedom on people’s life. It can therefore be
considered as a quite comprehensive approach. Maybe it will give us some keys to understand what
is wrong with self-targeting… 
The  rationale  of  social  transfers  is  consistent  with  Sen’s  capabilities  approach.  For  instance
transferring cash to poor households is likely to strengthen their capabilities. The same can be said for
food transfers : recipients’ capabilities is increased if they are better nourished and have a better
health. And receiving food also allows them to save money (the money that would otherwise have
been used to buy food). This money can be used for many purposes and increase their freedom of
choice. Do we have any reason to think that ST is better or worse than T? Yes indeed. We have two
good reasons to think that ST is likely to be better. First, as ST is more effective than T in targeting
poor  households,  ST  is  likely  to  have  a  stronger  effect  on  the  capabilities  of  people  with  low
capabilities. Second, ST offer more freedom of choice than T as the households themselves choose to
ask  for  the  transfer  or  not2.    Therefore  it  seems  that  both  the  consequentialist  and  the  non-
consequentialist components of Sen’s criteria converge toward the idea that ST is likely to be better
than T. It seems that approaches based on freedom do not help us a lot to understand what is wrong
with self-targeting. 
Maybe  the  individualist  approaches  explored  until  now  are  not  relevant.  Being  purely
consequentialist  (based  on  endowments  or  welfare)  or  partly  non-consequentialist  (based  on
freedoms), they are exclusively focused on individuals. Maybe this is there that we missed the point.
Because some elements can only be perceived at a broader scale, at the scale of social groups or
populations, rather than the scale of individuals.
Social relations and institutions
2 By the way, note that if freedom of choice has a value in itself for the agents themselves, it seems possible to
integrate this value within the utilitarian framework. This gives an additional advantage to ST (compared to T),
as having an additional option appears to increase the welfare: even the welfare of the agents who decide to
leave the option is increased.
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As said by a Niger village mayor (cited in Olivier de Sardan et al., 2014): “Transfers solve problems at
the household level and create problems at the village level!”. This citation gives some weight to the
idea that looking only at a broader scale may allow capturing effects of the transfers that cannot be
perceived at the level of individuals. What does it mean from the point of view of ethics to consider
effects on entities that are not human beings or animals? What does it mean to consider effects on
social relations or on social institutions? Maybe we can consider that social relations have a value in
themselves and that damaging them is a cost event if it does not affect the considered persons. Or
maybe it is better to consider that damaged social relations will affect humans beings by reducing
their endowments, their welfare or even maybe their freedoms. In this case, the effects on social
relations or social institutions are just intermediary effects in a causality chain, the final effect being
captured at the level of individual (in terms of endowments, welfare or freedoms).  I don’t know but,
for my purpose, it does not matter. The point is to investigate if the (potential) negative effects of
transfers on social relations or institutions are likely to be higher with T or ST. 
At this point, an element should be taken into account. The people who design and implement social
transfer programs are usually far (socially speaking) from the households that are potential recipients
of the transfers. They usually come from other countries or other regions of the same country and
they  are  members  of  different  social  classes.  This  social  distance often means different  ways  of
thinking and results in surrealistic situations where interventions are perceived as absurd or unfair.
To  analyse  this  phenomenon,  Jean-Pierre  Olivier  de  Sardan  developed  the  “anthropology  of
development”. It is based on the very attractive idea to study development project and emergency
aid from the point of view of the “beneficiaries”, and therefore potentially to view them as strange
and exotic entities. Exactly as Franz Boas, Claude Lévy-Strauss or Philippe Descola studied “primitive
peoples”. JP Olivier de Sardan is usually highly critical: he emphasized the gap between the visions of
the world of the designers and beneficiaries of development projects (or food aid interventions), and
the resulting unexpected effects of these projects or interventions. 
In particular, he developed a critical analysis of the cash transfers implemented in many villages of
Niger during the 2005 food crisis. These transfers were targeted through classical targeting methods
(T).  According  to  Jean-Pierre  Olivier  de  Sardan,  the  targeting  rules  used  by  NGOs  and  other
organizations that implemented the transfers were “incomprehensible” for local populations. They
often “contradict local norms, keep their distance with municipal authorities, raise suspicions and
exacerbate conflicts” (Olivier de Sardan et  al.,  2014, p.  107).  Population reacted by “treating the
‘humanitarian  rent’  as  a  form  of  the  usual  ‘development  rent’  [provided  by  the  numerous
development projects that intervene in Niger], and with the same criteria: everyone should try to ‘get
his share’. […] The targeting criteria used by donors (such as acute child malnutrition) were therefore
most of the time perceived as unfair, just as imposed conditionalities that should be circumnavigated”
(Olivier de Sardan et al., 2007, p. 21). A striking example is provided by the way households reacted
to the food transfers implemented by the WFP and the CCA [Niger public body in charge of managing
food crises]. As social targeting was too complicated to implement in this situation of emergency, the
choice was made to rely only on a geographical targeting and to distribute food to all households of
the selected villages. The amount distributed was supposed to be based on the size of the family: the
presentation of the family record book was therefore required to receive the transfers. However, the
need to present the family record book generated several problems. As, in Niger, some taxes depend
on the size of the family, in many families, many family members were not declared (resulting in
families receiving food for six persons whereas they were 20).  Moreover, the need for the family
record book gave rise to the idea that food transfers were a consequence of having paid the taxes
(and therefore a right for all tax-payers). Therefore, many people living in villages not covered did not
understood why they did not receive the transfers in spite  of  having paid their  taxes (Olivier de
10
Sardan,  2007,  pp.  29-30).  In  some localities  such  Tirmini,  an  additional  condition  was  added to
presenting the family record book: the presence of women was supposed to guarantee that the food
would benefit to the family consumption. Therefore, many men were in trouble because they did not
have a wife (they were dead or divorced) or because their wife was not available (ill or travelling), or
simply because they were not aware of this condition and living far from the delivery place of food
transfers. Therefore, women from Tirmini offered them the possibility of a marriage of convenience,
with the agreement of their husband (Olivier de Sardan et al., 2007, p. 30). 
Another striking example is provided by the episode of the “babies of luck” that also occurred during
the 2005 crisis. Due to the high level of child malnutrition (malnutrition rates have been the triggered
of  the  mobilisation  of  the  international  community  by  Médecins  Sans  Frontières or  MSF),  many
nutrition recovery centres have been set up. Following MSF, almost all NGOs that provided this kind
of aid provided food transfers to the families of undernourished children. Having children considered
as undernourished therefore became an entry ticket to get grains and other food products (beans, oil,
sugar). As the amount of the food transfer was quite high (with MSF, 50 kg of millet, 25 kg of beans
and 10 litres of oil when the child leaves the nutritional recovery centre), it was attractive for rural
households.  Women who came back in  their  village with the food from the nutritional  recovery
centre were congratulated and having a child classified as undernourished was perceived as a chance
and the considered children were called the “babies of luck”. The criterion of selection (a strap to
measure the mid-arm circumference) was completely incomprehensible for the local populations, all
the more that for them being thin is not perceived to be a disease. As a result, the women who went
far to reach a nutritional recovery centre and came back with nothing did not understand why they
“make selections whereas everybody is hungry”. Of course, many strategies were developed including
going to the recovery centre with a child from another family or provoking diarrhoea in children to
make them lose weight (Olivier de Sardan et al., 2007, pp. 31-33). 
In order to avoid destabilising effects on social structures and institutions, the transfers received are
often reallocated, which sometimes results in nullifying the targeting. Transfers are often reallocated
within the household: the most frequent situation is that wives have to give the money received to
their husbands and they did it most of the time. But transfers are also sometimes reallocated within
the community:  the cash received is  bulked and distributed equally  to all  the households  of  the
village either directly or in the form of food purchased with the cash gathered. In some occasion, part
of the money is used to pay the taxes of the village (Olivier de Sardan et al., 2014, pp. 120-121).
For our purpose, this  analysis  has two limitations. First,  it  is not a normative analysis:  it  aims to
analyze the different unintended effect of cash transfers, by presenting households’ behaviors and
their  motivations.  Of  course,  it  is  a  highly  critical  analysis,  but  its  final  goal  is  not  to  formulate
judgments such as “X is good and Y is bad” or “X is better than Z”. Second, it only deals with T (not
ST): all these examples of transfers’ potential destructuring effects on social relations and institutions
are related to transfers implemented through classical targeting methods (T). Nevertheless, it seems
possible to build on Olivier de Sardan analysis to investigate the (potential) adverse consequences of
ST. Although, strictly speaking, Olivier de Sardan analysis is not normative, it clearly emphasizes the
violence  that  may  result  from  transfers  targeted  through  external  norms.  And  maybe  we  can
reasonably infer from it the following normative criterion: “the more transfers are targeted according
to rules understood and accepted by the population, the better”. His analysis showed that, assessed
under this criterion, transfers with T have a very poor performance. What about ST? Do we have any
reason to think that the situation can be even worse with ST? Although, he did not study in detail any
form of ST, Olivier de Sardan is quite indulgent with cash for work programs (one of the modalities of
ST). This is because the rationale of cash for work is in line with local practices: when facing a food
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crisis, the members of poor households usually accept hard and bad paid jobs (for instance in other
farms). It is worth noting that the same argument can also be applied to the other modalities of self-
targeting:  when  facing  a  food  crisis,  poor  households  often  queue  in  the  anteroom  of  friends,
familiars or relatives. Or accept to eat bad quality food such as wild leaves (during Niger 2005 food
crisis,  some families  even eat  ants’  food).  It  seems therefore  that  the deterring  effects  of  social
transfers on social relations and institutions are likely to be lower with ST than with T. It seems that
the anthropology of development will not help us a lot to understand what is wrong with ST...
Synthesis
None of the approaches reviewed seems able to explain our feeling that there is “something wrong”
with self-targeting. This is surprising in a way because these approaches are quite representative of
the different possible approaches that can be used to formulate a normative judgment: individualistic
versus holistic, consequentialists versus non-consequentialists, objectivists versus subjectivists (see
figure 1).  
FIGURE 1. Typology of the approaches reviewed
Whatever the approach used, ST appears to be at least as good as T, and often better. This is because:
(a) ST is generally less costly than T : with the same budget, the amount transferred can be
higher with ST
(b) ST is generally more effective than T (less errors of targeting) : the amount transferred  is
channeled through poorer or more food-insecure households 
(c) ST allows households to choose if they will be recipients of the transfers or not (contrary to
T). 
These different factors play a different role depending on the considered approach: the superiority of
ST  over  T stems from (a)  and (b)  for  approaches based on endowments,  from factor  (c)  for  the
Libertarian approach of freedom and for the anthropology of development and from (a), (b) and (c)
for approaches based on welfare and Sen’s approach of freedom based on capabilities.
The only factor that can play against ST is the “inconvenience” intentionally introduced to induce the
self-targeting: having to provide a matching contribution in the form of work, having to queue, having
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to eat a low quality food. However, the cost of this inconvenience is usually assumed to be quite low
compared to the risk of food-insecure households not receiving the transfer they need. The cost of
having to queue or to work to receive the food or the cash you need to feed your family seems to be
quite low, especially for poor households who have very few alternative opportunities. And the fact
that, with ST, recipient households choose to ask for the transfers seems to be a proof that, for them,
the benefit of receiving the transfer is higher than the cost incurred to get it. 
Maybe now you began to ask yourself if there is really something wrong with self-targeting. Maybe it
is time for you to ask to yourself to each part of humanity you belong to. Are you among those who
“don’t see where the problem is” or among those who are horrified? If (as me) you belong to the
second category, then you have to answer yourself why”. You don’t like an efficient way to provide
food aid to people in need? You don’t like them being free to choose whether they want to receive
the transfers or not, thereby preventing feelings of exclusion or stigmatization? You don’t like people
being responsible of their own food security? You don’t like freedom? 
Definitively, you have to ask to yourself “What is wrong with self-targeting food aid?”. The following
section presents my hypothesis.
4. A HYPOTHESIS 
My hypothesis is based on four observations derived from the previous sections. First, assessing T
and ST through the flows of food or cash they allocate is helpless to understand what may be wrong
with ST.  Second, assessing T and ST through their effect on the freedom of choice of the recipients is
helpless as well to capture the “dark side” of ST. Third, the problem with ST is probably linked to the
inconvenience  intentionally  introduce  to  generate  households’  self-targeting.  Four,  analyzing  this
inconvenience as a cost does not allow to understand what is wrong with self-targeting (for starving
households, the opportunity cost of the time wasted to queue or work is low compared to the benefit
resulting from the transfer). 
My hypothesis is also based on the additional observation that transfers do not only provide flows of
resources (food, cash): they also provide messages. These (implicit) messages are related to all the
characteristics of the transfers: nature (food, cash, vouchers), amount, frequency and targeting (who
is recipient and who is not). We have many evidences that transfers always convey messages, even
when not accompanied by awareness actions (for instance on nutrition). The main example is related
to the so-called “citizenship effect” of the transfers. It has been observed that households increase
more their food consumption when their income increases because of a (cash or food) transfer than
when it increases for other reasons. This fact show that transfers convey an (implicit) message related
to the importance that should be given to the food consumption of the family. It is even more than
that: impact assessment studies showed that food transfers usually provoke a stronger increase in
calorie consumption than cash transfers do and that, conversely, cash transfers usually generate a
stronger increase in food expenditures (for a review, see Gentillini, 2005). What can be interpreted as
follows: when a household receive a food transfers (mainly made of grains in developing countries) it
also receive an implicit message “consume more calories”. And when it receives a cash transfer, the
message is “spend more money on food consumption”.     
These five observations lead me to formulate the following hypothesis to explain what is wrong with
ST: 
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“When ST is implemented, messages are conveyed by the inconvenience purposely introduced
to generate the self-targeting (having to queue, having to provide a matching contribution in
work, having to eat low quality food). The deterring effects of self-targeting are related to these
messages.”
More precisely, my hypothesis is that the messages conveyed by ST provoke three types of effects:
(1) They convey to households (to all households of the considered community, not just those
who choose to ask for the transfer) an information about how they are perceived by those
who  provide  them  the  transfers  (the  government  of  their  country  or  the  international
community when the transfers are provided by international NGOs or UN organizations). The
implicit messages conveyed by ST tell them that they are viewed as people suited to do a
bad-paid job, to spend time in queueing or to eat low quality food. And these messages can
be extremely  violent:  in  some occasions,  maize  has  been distributed to populations  that
usually use maize exclusively to feed cattle.  
(2) They convey to households (to all households of the considered community) the message
that their destiny is in their hands, that they are responsible of their own food security. This is
because the transfers are proposed to them (to all of them) and they can take them or leave
them. This kind of messages can be considered positively (building autonomous individuals
instead  of  assisting  them)  or  negatively  (changing  individuals  to  make  them  become
entrepreneurs  of  their  own  life  can  be  seen  as  a  form  of  violence,  see  the  numerous
criticisms of neoliberalism).
(3) There is  something more:  the messages conveyed by the transfers  are  not only made of
words: they are lived “in their body” by recipient households: the low-quality food is eaten;
recipients  have to use  their  body to queue a long time or provide a bad-paid work.  For
recipients, accepting the transfers therefore means constraining their body to some kind of
self-discipline.
In brief, the different types of inconveniences purposely introduced in ST to provoke households’ self-
targeting produce messages. For the considered households, these messages may involve different
types of violence: a violence linked to the negative image of themselves that is sent to them (and may
affect their self-esteem); a violence linked to the injunction to change themselves; a violence lived in
their body for the households who accept the transfers.
It seems to me that this hypothesis explains well why ST divide humanity between those who don’t
see the problem and those who are horrified. If you consider only the material flows provided by the
transfers or required to get them, you will not see any problem: it is obviously better to eat low-
quality food than nothing (and suffer from malnutrition) and it is worth queuing or providing a work
(even bad-paid) if this allows you to feed your family. But, if you include in your analysis the message
conveyed by the targeting method used (and the violence carried through these messages), you may
be horrified by self-targeting. 
How can this hypothesis be related to the different approaches reviewed in this article? We identified
a new dimension of T and ST: the implicit  messages they sent and the violence carried by these
messages. Can this new dimension be included in these approaches?
For approaches based on endowments, the answer is clearly “no” because the symbolic violence
does not affect the flows of cash or food (the only thing that matters for this approach). Let us come
back to the example of the (extreme) case where maize has been distributed to populations that
usually use maize exclusively to feed cattle. No doubt households not in needs did not ask for the
transfers: the self-targeting has probably been extremely effective to exclude those who should be
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excluded. Maybe it went too far in that direction and resulted in excluding also part of food insecure
households (as they may have preferred to suffer from hunger than to eat food considered as food for
animals).  Let  us assume it  has not been the case. Then, in this  case, ST proved to be extremely
effective (no errors of targeting). As the distributed maize was safe and nutritive, it played his role to
support the nutrition of recipient households’ members. Then, approaches based on endowments do
not see any problem because they do not take into account the extremely violent message conveyed
and its deterring effect of people self-esteem.   
By contrast, approaches based on welfare can easily include this new dimension: the violent message
is assume to a disutility which has to be balanced with the utility generated by the transfer received.
Note that the effects (1) and (2) do not depend on whether the household accept the transfer or not:
households who do not ask for the transfers are also hit by the violence conveyed by the message. To
keep the same (extreme) example, if someone propose to offer you food which you perceived as food
for animal, you will be hurt even if you refuse (and even more if you accept). This remark entails a
very important consequence : as part of the damages causes by self-targeting affect all households,
they are already affected when they make their decision to ask for the transfer or not. This means not
only that self-targeted transfers negatively affect the non-recipients (those who choose to reject the
transfers)  but  also  that  there  is  no  guaranty  that  these  transfers  increase  the  welfare  of  the
recipients : although it is better for them to accept the transfer than to reject it (otherwise, they will
not accept it), they may have been better-off if no transfer had been proposed to them (because in
this case they would have been preserved from the symbolic violence conveyed by self-targeting).
However, although approaches based on welfare can easily include the symbolic violence, they may
find  difficulties  in  putting  it  in  balance  with  the  positive  effects  resulting  from  the  better  cost-
effectiveness of ST (compared to T). Could we accept some dose of symbolic violence to improve food
security (thereby reducing another type of violence)?
Anthropology of development can also easily include the symbolic violence conveyed by ST. As a
matter of fact, the analysis produced by J.-P. Olivier de Sardan and his colleagues on cash transfers in
Niger are all about the implicit messages sent by the way these transfers were targeted. Although
they did not refer explicitly to messages, they focused their analysis on the fact that the rules used to
target  the  transfers  are  not  understood  and  are  therefore  perceived  to  be  absurd  or  arbitrary.
Therefore, they implicitly consider that transfers are not just flows but also messages, messages that
are not understandable because of the “noise” generated  by the social distance (or the cultural gap)
between the designers of the targeting and the population of potential recipients. Messages were
therefore already present in their analysis of T (they only analyzed transfers targeted through classical
methods). It seems therefore natural to include the implicit messages in the analysis of ST. This is not
what I  did. When I  tried to build a criterion based on Olivier de Sardan’s works,  I  just  take into
account the fact  that the different types of  inconveniences purposely introduced in ST are quite
similar  to  inconveniences  that  already  exist  in  the  coping  strategies  implemented  buy  poor
households when a food crisis occurs: accepting bad-paid jobs, queueing in the anterooms of friends
or relatives to ask for aid, eating low quality food (including in some occasions animal food). And I
wrongly deduced from these similarities that the inconveniences purposely introduced in ST should
be  understood  and  accepted  quite  easily  by  the  considered  households.  In  fact,  this  is  more
complicated because the message sent through ST’s inconvenience changes everything: having to eat
animal food to survive is extremely different from receiving animal food from people who could have
given you human food. In the second case a symbolic violence is carried out through the message
that you are perceived as a human being that note deserve to eat human food, as a human being for
whom animal food is adequate. Of course, this is an extreme example. But it does not matter: you
can replace “animal” by “low quality food” and you will reach the same conclusions. The point is that
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anthropology allows us to think the violence. Both the symbolic violence carried by classical targeting
methods  T  (as  shown in  the  works  of  Olivier  de  Sardan  and  his  colleagues)  and  the  (stronger)
symbolic violence generated by ST. It is not just a matter of being jealous, or of feeling excluded or
stigmatized. It is a matter of being hurt deep inside: on the representation of you other people have
and, by this way, also on the picture you have of yourself. What may be damaged is your self. Your
self-esteem and  your  dignity.  This  symbolic  violence  comes  from the  exterior  of  the  considered
population of potential recipients: it  comes from the government or the international community
(depending  on  who  provide  the  transfers).  It  likely  affects  all  households  of  the  considered
population. But it likely affects more those who accepted the transfers and may feel ashamed. The
symbolic  violence  may  also  widespread  inside  the  considered  population  if  some  non-recipient
households begin to see recipient households through the glasses of the negative picture projected
by ST. In brief, anthropology helps us to understand that the symbolic violence conveyed by ST hit
something deep inside people, something related to their self, self-esteem and dignity. This logically
leads us to consider the last category of approaches: approaches based on rights and freedoms.  
Approaches based on freedoms may lead to the conclusion that the symbolic violence conveyed by
self-targeting is not acceptable because it violates one of the fundamental rights of human beings.
For instance, we can maybe consider  that this  symbolic  violence should be forbidden because it
violates  the capability  #7.2  of  Martha Nussbaum’s  list  of  10  core  capabilities  (Nussbaum, 2011):
“Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified
being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin and species”. 
5. CONCLUSION
The research presented in this article aimed to solve three puzzles. Identify what drives the feeling
(felt by many people) that there is something wrong with self-targeting. Explain why some people are
horrified by self-targeting while others do not see any problem with it. Specify who is wrong and who
is right, i.e. clarify if there is really something wrong with self-targeting. 
To solve the first puzzle, we compare self-targeting (ST) with classical targeting methods (T) by using
different criteria proposed by ethics and related to endowments, welfare and freedoms. None of the
criteria reviewed helped us to understand what may be wrong with self-targeting: as ST is generally
less costly than T and more effective to target poor or food-insecure households, it is generally better
under consequentialists criteria;  as ST allows households to choose if they will be recipients of the
transfers or not (contrary to T), they are generally better under non-consequentialists criteria related
to the freedom to choose.
To complement our analysis, we mobilized the empirical results of the anthropology of development
that  showed (for  the case  of  Niger)  the numerous  unintended effects  of  cash transfers  targeted
through classical methods (T) and their adverse consequences on social relations and institutions. The
anthropology of development does not explicitly propose normative criteria but, as it shows that the
deterring effects of transfers were due to the use of targeting methods perceived as absurd or unfair
by the population of the considered area, we consider the criterion that the more the targeting rules
are  understandable  and  acceptable  by  the  consider  population,  the  better.  The  fact  is  that  the
inconveniences purposely introduced in self-targeting (matching contribution in work, queues and
low quality food) seems to be quite similar to local practices : when facing a food crisis the members
of poor households usually i) accept hard and bad paid jobs, ii) queue in the anteroom of friends,
familiars or relatives or iii) eat bad quality food such as wild leaves (or even animal food). Therefore,
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ST seems to be more understandable than T for the considered population, and therefore to produce
less deterring effects on social relations and institutions. 
A  solution  to  the  first  puzzle  was  finally  found.  We  made  the  hypothesis  that  when  ST  is
implemented, messages are conveyed by the inconvenience purposely introduced to generate the
self-targeting (having to queue, having to provide a matching contribution in work, having to eat low
quality food) and that the “dark side” of self-targeting is related to these messages because they
involve different types of violence: a violence linked to the negative image of themselves sent to
potential recipients (being persons suited to do a bad-paid job, to queue or to eat low quality food); a
violence linked to the injunction to change themselves to become entrepreneur of their own food
security; and finally, for the households who accept the transfers, a violence lived in their own body
(constrained to a kind of self –discipline : eating low quality food, working, queueing).
This hypothesis also provides a solution to the second and third puzzles. If some people are horrified
by self-targeting whereas others don’t see any problem with it, it is because the first group take into
account the messages conveyed by the inconvenience purposely introduced in self-targeting and the
violence generated by this messages. By contrast, the second group only consider the material flows
provided by the transfers or required to get them, and these flows do not raise any ethical problems:
when you suffer from malnutrition, it is obviously better to eat low-quality safe food than nothing,
and it is worth queuing or working, even for a low wage. 
The third puzzle is the more complicated one. Who is wrong and who is right? Those who support
self-targeting because of its amazing cost-effectiveness? Or those who are horrified by its violence?
My feeling  is  that  the second group of  persons has a more comprehensive  approach because it
includes effects that are ignored by the first group. I am referring of course to all the effects conveyed
by the implicit  messages  sent  when self-targeting  is  used (especially  the  symbolic  violence  they
generate). Of course, one may argue that that the advantages of ST (compared to T) have to be put in
balance with their drawbacks and that it can be justified to introduce some dose of symbolic violence
to improve food security or reduce poverty (and, by this way, reduce other forms of –economic-
violence). My personal feeling is that the best approaches are the ones that mix fundamental rights
and freedoms that should be guaranteed (whatever their consequences) with criteria based on the
-objectives  or  subjective-  consequences  (like  John  Rawls  ‘approach  or  the  approaches  based  on
capabilities). My feeling is that because of the symbolic violence it generates, self-targeting should be
abandoned…
Finally, it appears that the analysis developed here for self-targeting could be (should be?) applied to
other tools used to increase food security, reduce poverty or enhance development. These tools are
classically  assessed  exclusively  with  criteria  related  to  their  cost-effectiveness  or  their  impact  of
people’s income or welfare. But what we found for self-targeting may also be valid for them. Maybe
these tools (or the way they are implemented or governed) in some occasions generate “collateral
damages”,  in  the  form  of  an  invisible  symbolic  violence  that  hit  the  “beneficiaries”  of  these
interventions,  not  only  in  their  mind but  also sometimes in  their  body (Foucault  1975;  Foucault
2004).
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